“Benevolent Plans Meritoriously Applied:”

How Missouri Almost Became
an Indian Nation, 1803–1811
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Maps such as these were
published in the early
nineteenth century to plot the
general locations of Native
American tribes. Such a
map as this would have been
the best available information
for Jefferson. (Image:
Cartography Associates)
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M C M A H O N

…to carry on the benevolent plans which have been so meritoriously applied
to the conversion of our aboriginal neighbors from the degradation and
wretchedness of savage life to a participation of the improvements of which the
human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state.
— James Madison,
First Inaugural Address, 4 March 18091

In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson designed
the first official American governmental policy of
relocating Indians, one that encouraged them to become
farmers and integrate into the United States as citizens.
The Jeffersonian approach to Indian-white relations
ostensibly planned for assimilation after the Natives
voluntarily relocated to the west. Jefferson and his
disciples had differing opinions about the Natives
but believed they had the same rights to life, liberty,
and property as the whites, and that they expected
the United States to uphold honorably all treaties
and obligations between them. While not the only
advocate of the policy named in his honor, he was
the first executive given the power and authority by
Congress to treat Native Americans as he saw fit.2
The president envisioned much of the area west of
the Mississippi as a land where the Indians could
live completely separated from white society east of
the river. During this separation, Indians could then
abandon their tribal ways and embrace so-called
civilized agriculture. Once Indians conformed to
the American ideal, they could ostensibly integrate
into American culture. This vision for Missouri,
however, completely failed. By 1838, Americans
of European descent claimed the entirety of
the state. The removal of indigenous peoples
from Missouri occurred in a short span of
time, fewer than twenty years
after statehood. This
diaspora is a
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During his presidency (1801-1809), Thomas Jefferson
(1743-1826) was instrumental in shaping federal Indian
policy. By purchasing Louisiana from France, he also
acquired a place to which the United States could move
native tribes. Jefferson was also a great advocate of the
factory system, and expanded it during his presidency.
(Image: Library of Congress)
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remarkable, if ignoble, feat considering that more than a
dozen tribes comprised of thousands of individuals either
hunted or lived in the territory of Missouri. However,
continuous violence, the failure to fulfill promises made
to the Indians, and the inability to bind the tribes in total
economic dependence on the United States all contributed
to the failure of Jefferson’s vision leading to the eventual
triumph of the Jacksonian Ideal of forced removal.
Jefferson believed the Missouri Territory represented
an excellent opportunity to solve the “Indian problem.”
To most Americans, the Natives were a chaotic, barely
post–Stone Age people who occupied, but did not own or
improve, their land. The Jefferson Ideal envisioned turning
a hunter-gatherer people into citizen-farmers by ending
savage behavior and peacefully enticing all Eastern tribes
to move voluntarily west of the Mississippi. Not only
would this transfer end conflict in the Appalachian region
and Northwest Territory, it would give the Indians several
generations away from encroaching white settlers, to learn,
with the help of missionaries, teachers, and cultural agents,
the benefits of the American agricultural civilization.3
Jefferson’s goal of integration, however, was
achievable only if several conditions became reality. The
first was to induce all the eastern tribes to move west of
the Mississippi River. Second, inter-tribal warfare, as
well as raids against white settlements, needed to cease.
Third, the Indians must, after moving, remain separated
from all white populations while adapting to an agrarian
culture. The division transcended mere racism. Jefferson
was aware that unscrupulous traders were willing to sell
alcohol and firearms to Natives, a volatile combination
that often led to tragedy. He also wanted to keep other
European powers from weaning the tribes away from
American dependency. If Britain or Spain continued
to supply and trade with the Natives, the entire plan
failed. The Jefferson Ideal was more optimistic than
realistic, for there were too many unforeseen variables
unfolding to overcome, and too many assumptions about
the cooperative nature of humanity. One of the glaring
problems was that the majority of the white population
never accepted tribes that successfully adopted the mores
of the larger American society. Not surprisingly, a culture
that casually overlooked the enslavement of Africans
did not easily embrace coexistence with others not of
European descent. In 1804, however, President Jefferson
had reason to believe in his plan’s eventual success.
The integration was possible, to Jefferson’s way of
thinking, because he believed the North American Indian
was equal in mind and body to the European. As early as
1785, in a letter to Francois-Jean de Chastellux, an officer
with the French expeditionary forces fighting against
the British, the future president disputed the naturalist
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon’s assessment
of the Indian as an inferior. In an 1802 correspondence to
Brother Handsome Lake, a Seneca war chief, Jefferson
declared the United States would not force Indians to sell
their land, nor allow private citizens to purchase directly
from the tribes. This promise became federal law that same
year.4

When Samuel Lewis published this map as “The Travellers Guide” in 1819, Missouri’s application for statehood was
still pending before Congress. Two years later, it would be the first state to enter the union that was entirely west of the
Mississippi in the Louisiana Purchase. (Image: Cartography Associates)

Jefferson’s ideas on white-Indian relations came not
only from his own experiences and ideas but also from
previous presidential strategies and English and American
legislation. Section IX of the Articles of Confederation
granted Congress the sole right to manage all dealings,
including trade, with the Indians, as long as it did not
supersede the rights of the individual states. The Ordinance
for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs
in 1786 established three Indian districts governed by
superintendents responsible for implementing government
policy. Article III in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
read,
The utmost good faith shall always
be observed toward the Indians; their
lands and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent . . .
they never shall be invaded or disturbed,
unless in just and lawful wars authorized
by Congress; but laws founded in justice
and humanity shall … be made for …
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Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788),
influenced at least two generations of naturalists through
his writings while the head of the Jardin du Roi (now the
Jardin des Plantes) in Paris. He was also a proponent
of monogenism, thinking that all races came from a
common origin, which influenced some thinkers in their
work on Indian relations. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives,
Lindenwood University)

preserving peace and friendship with
them.5
To those who followed the Jefferson ideal, the Indians
also had inalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and
especially, property.
After the United States adopted the Constitution in
1789, Congress continued the policies begun under the
Articles. The only other important legislation dealing with
Native Americans in the last decade of the eighteenth
century was the Intercourse Act of 1790, which forbade
trading with Indians unless a private citizen obtained a
trading license, issuable only by the president, Secretary
of War, or one of the Indian Affairs superintendents.
The statute also prohibited committing crimes against,
or trespassing upon, any “friendly” Indians or their
property, and more importantly, disallowed any private
citizen or state from purchasing land from Natives.
Another Intercourse Act in 1802, urged upon Congress
by Jefferson and based loosely on King George III of
England’s Proclamation of 1763, set the final stage for
American-Indian relations until the 1830s. This law
established the Mississippi River as the official boundary
line between whites and Indians, forbade Americans from
hunting or entering the western territory without prior
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permission, prohibited white settlement upon Indian lands,
and established the death penalty for the killing of an
Indian. It also forbade anyone except a duly authorized
government agent from forging treaties with the Natives,
and it transferred power in dealing with the Indians from
Congress to the president, granting the executive branch
the sole discretion to deal with indigenous peoples as that
office saw fit. While some of the provisions in the act
changed after the Louisiana Purchase, the last two points
remained in full effect, explaining why presidential policy
was so important to Indians.6
Legislatively, Jefferson’s proposal for voluntary
Indian removal became law in March 1804. The Removal
Act divided the Louisiana Territory into two governmental
regions: one controlled through New Orleans, the other
centered in St. Louis. The Act also confirmed the right
of the executive branch to establish trading houses in
the territory as well as granting Indian leaders food and
protection should they so choose to visit the president.
Section 15 of this provision granted the president the
ability to negotiate with the Indians for land east of
the Mississippi in exchange for land west of the river,
provided the tribe remove itself and settle on the new
property. In doing so, the tribe placed itself under
protection of the United States and therefore could no
longer enter into agreements with any other foreign power,
state, or individual. The transactions were voluntary; there
is no mention of compulsion of any kind. This legislation
served as the basis for Indian removal until 1830 when it
was replaced, at the behest of President Andrew Jackson,
with an act that gave the federal government the legal
power to remove to the west those tribes who refused to
relocate under the 1804 law.7
The Osage was the major tribe in Missouri, and it had
a reputation among the Spanish and surrounding Natives
as both fearsome warriors and uncooperative neighbors.
Despite white fears to the contrary, however, the various
Osage tribes proved receptive to American overtures. The
estimated non-Indian population living in Missouri in
1804 was 6,500 whites, with a potential 2,000 available
for militia duty, as well as 1,380 slaves. There were
various estimates as to the number of Osage still residing
in Missouri, but it was generally believed to be at least
equal to the white population, not including thousands of
Natives from other nations within the borders. Americans
wanted closer ties with the Osage, not only for the
lucrative fur trade but also because both Spain and Great
Britain actively sought alliances with them. The threat of
European interference from both of those empires was a
real and tangible fear that overshadowed the first ten years
of Osage-American relations in Missouri.8
After meeting with several key Osage leaders in
July 1804, Jefferson promised a trading factory9 for
the Osage. The factory system began in March 1795
when Congress authorized trading houses to supply
the Natives with goods in return for furs. The factories
appropriated the Indian trade from the private business
sector and ostensibly placed it exclusively in the hands

The Northwest Ordinance is among the most significant documents in American constitutional history, in that it established
a model for organizing western territories that became the foundation for western settlement. That settlement also put the
United States government in conflict with the tribes already living there. (Image: Library of Congress)

of the government. Designed to secure the friendship and
goodwill of the Indians, factories enabled the government
to limit Native access to alcohol and some firearms. By
law, factory traders provided quality goods to the Indians
at cost, a rule not applied to the private businessmen who
overcharged the Indians whenever possible. Factories also
became bloodless weapons by withholding goods from
hostile tribes, thus providing the blueprint for economic
sanctions.10
The executive branch had exclusive power over
the factories, empowered to place them anywhere in the
United States and hire agents to run them. The agents
reported to the Treasury Department, swore oaths of
scrupulousness, were required to keep accurate records,
and, beginning in 1806, to file quarterly reports. Never
designed as a permanent solution, the factory system
required periodic approval from Congress to continue
operations. The Trading House Act of 1806 authorized
the president to establish factories outside the borders of

the United States and directly preceded the establishment
of factories in Missouri. To Jefferson, the trading house
program was the essential lynchpin for the success of his
voluntary Indian removal policy. In a letter to Indiana
Territory Governor William Henry Harrison dated
February 27, 1803, the president outlined his goals by
alluding to the public record, but informing the governor
that because this communique “—being unofficial and
private, I may with safety give you a more extensive view
of our policy respecting the Indians.”11
In this letter, Jefferson explained to Harrison that in
order to achieve the goal of “perpetual peace with the
Indian,” the United States must pursue friendly relations
and do everything legally and morally possible to protect
them from injuries inflicted on them by Americans. It was
imperative, Jefferson continued, that the Indians become
civilized farmers (men) and weavers (women). To become
farmers, the government must induce the Indians to leave
their vast hunting and gathering territory to accept small
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When the Jefferson administration authorized the creation
of Fort Osage, Indian Agent William Clark traveled west to
meet with the Osage, sign a treaty, and establish the fort.
The original fort was Clark’s design, pictured here. (Image:
Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)

parcels of private property. The best way to achieve this
goal was through trading houses established by men of
probity. The goal of these trading houses, he explained,
was not profit but rather to ensure Indian reliance on
white goods. Either the Natives would use the tools of
civilization wisely as farmers or become so indebted by
their reliance on American goods that their only recourse
would be to sell tribal lands. In this way, tribes either
would join the United States as citizens or trade land
in the east for land west of the Mississippi River. This
policy of indebting the Indians in order to induce them to
move, Jefferson asserted, was the humane way of solving
the problem of uncivilized Indians within the nation’s
borders.12
Between 1808 and 1822 Missouri had five factories:
Fort Osage, Arrow Rock (near the Osage River), Belle
Fontaine (near St. Louis), Marais de Cygnes (near
Missouri’s western border), and Fort Johnson (near
Hannibal). The items Indians most desired included
blankets, jewelry, rouge (war paint), kitchen utensils,
groceries (salt, sugar, flour, raisins, tea, coffee), drugs
and medicines, tobacco, pipes, guns, and powder. While
the factories offered agricultural supplies, few tribes took
advantage of them. The Indians could purchase anything
they desired from the factories, with the exception of
playing cards and alcohol, by placing an order with the
trading agent. To pay for the purchase of desired goods,
Indians in Missouri provided all types of furs and pelts.13
Natives also produced goods that many Americans desired,
such as deer tallow, bear oil, beeswax, feathers, snakeroot,
lead, maple sugar, cattle, cotton, corn, feather mats, buffalo
horns, deer antlers, and handicrafts. The Osage buffalo
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tallow candles, for example, were so popular that even the
White House in Washington used them.14
The first factory in Missouri at Fort Belle Fountaine,
or Bellefountaine, located about fifteen miles west of St.
Louis, opened in 1805. Fort Belle Fountaine was also the
first factory west of the Mississippi River, and the first
American fort as well. Designed to serve the needs of
the Sac and Fox, Ioway, and Osage tribes, it proved too
distant from any of those tribes to conduct regular trade.
In addition, raids against each other, as well as white
settlements, continued by all three tribes during their treks
to and from the factory. To separate the tribes, the War
Department authorized the building of two new factories
closer to each Native settlement, Fort Madison in Iowa,
and Fort Osage in Missouri.15
The responsibility for implementation of this policy
fell to America’s most famous explorers. In 1807,
Meriwether Lewis became governor of the Louisiana
Territory, and William Clark became a brigadier general
and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for all tribes west of
the Mississippi, with the exception of the Osage. Lewis,
however, was little interested in tribal affairs and gladly let
Clark deal with the Natives. Thus began Clark’s long and
illustrious career as America’s premier Indian diplomat.
Clark’s job was not an easy one, for he constantly had
to deal with tensions, sometimes even outright violence,
between western tribes and newly arrived natives form the
east.16
The purpose of Fort Osage was, like all factories, to
cement Native reliance upon the United States. Since the
Osage tribes lived exclusively west of the Mississippi, the
intention was not to entice them to move but rather to cede

Fort Osage remained an Indian trade factory site until Congress disbanded the factory system in 1822. The original fort in
Sibley, Missouri, east of present-day Kansas City, has been recreated by Jackson County Parks. (Image: Jean De Moss)

their claims to land in Missouri so that eastern tribes could
settle there. Both Governor Lewis and the Secretary of War
also instructed Clark to stop the Osage from conducting
raids on whites and other tribes. The new superintendent
believed the threat of ending the trade upon which that
tribe depended for survival would be sufficient enticement
to accomplish this daunting task.17
William Clark authored more Indian treaties than
any other individual in American history. The first one
was with the Osage in 1808. With this treaty, the Osage
ceded three quarters of the land that comprised Missouri
to the United States. As a Superintendent of Indian Affairs,
William Clark had full authority to conduct negotiations
with all Indians in the Louisiana Purchase Territory and
forward any agreements reached to Congress for approval.
Between 1808 and 1825, he negotiated five more treaties
with the Osage in Missouri.18
When 1808 began, the Osage were at war with the
Western Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Sioux, Ioways,
and Sacs and Foxes. Clark, charged with maintaining
peace in Missouri, moved to St. Louis to end the fighting.
The frontier town suited the superintendent well, and
he remained a citizen of that city for the rest of his life,
even after retiring from government service. For the
present, however, he was frustrated with the Osage’s
unwillingness to end their raids against other tribes. This
constant raiding among the Indians sometimes spilled
over and involved white settlers, encouraging the first
public rumblings against Indian removal from the Missouri
Valley. At the urging of Frederick Bates, Secretary of the
Louisiana Territory and later second governor of the state
of Missouri, the president reluctantly agreed to military
retaliation for the first time against the Osage. Governor
Lewis, anxious to maintain peace, sent a message to
several Osage chiefs informing them that if raids did

not stop, trade between the two nations would cease and
their tribe with the declared outside of the United States’
protection. Due to the high profitability of the Osage fur
trade, the American government until this time had done
everything short of military involvement to discourage
attacks. With this missive, however, Governor Lewis let
the Osage know he was willing to ignore attacks on the
Big and Little by the many enemy tribes that surrounded
the Osage.19
To avoid forced military involvement, Superintendent
Clark quickly proceeded with his plans to build a factory
close to the Osage. A firm Jeffersonian, he believed the
quickest and best way to end Native raids was irrevocably
to bind them to economic dependence on the federal
government. He was also concerned about the influence
of the British, whose traders had for years surreptitiously
made overtures to the Osage, and the Spanish, who,
although their influence had greatly waned, still posed
a threat of alliance with Native tribes in the area. In
August 1808, Clark, along with a military force under the
command of Daniel Boone’s son, Nathan, and the man the
superintendent chose to run the factory, a fellow believer
in the Jeffersonian ideal, George Sibley, arrived at the bluff
on the Missouri River described in the Lewis and Clark
expedition journals five years earlier.20
While the fort and factory were under construction
in September 1808, invitations to trade at the post were
sent to Natives from several surrounding tribes, including
the Osage, Kansa, Oto, Maha, Pawnee, Sioux, Ioway,
and Sac and Fox. At first, only the Osage responded. On
September13, eighty Osage arrived from two villages,
and Clark immediately held a council with the Indians,
with Pierre Chouteau and his friends Paul Loise and Noel
Magrain acting as interpreters. Clark explained to the
Osage that due to “theft, murder, and robory [sic] on the
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George Sibley (1782-1863) served as factor at the Indian
trade factory embedded in Fort Osage from its founding
in 1808 until Congress disbanded the factory system in
1822. It was the only trade factory that showed a profit on
every report to Washington. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives,
Lindenwood University)

Citizens of the U.S. in this Territory … I shall propose
a line to be run between the U.S. and the Osage hunting
lands ….” This line, the superintendent explained, would
begin at the fort and run south to the Arkansas River, and
all land south of the Missouri River and east of this line
would be “given up by the Osage to the U.S. forever.”21
The Osage agreed, and everyone met again on
September 14 to sign the treaty Clark had written
overnight. The superintendent carefully read the provisions
of the treaty to the gathered Osage, after which Clark and
Sibley, both anxious to preserve the honor and good faith
of the United States, independently wrote that the Natives
eagerly signed. The twelve articles contained the following
provisions: The fort would provide protection to the Osage
who dwelt near it, and the factory would provide goods
as long as the Natives conducted themselves in a friendly,
peaceable, and honest manner toward the citizens of the
United States and their allies. No other tribe could trade
at the factory unless they had “smoked the Pipe of Peace”
with the Osage.22 Furthermore, the United States agreed to
furnish the tribe with a blacksmith and mill, pay the tribes
a lump sum for the land as well as a yearly indemnity,
minus compensation for any thefts or raid damages caused
by members of the tribes, and assume liability for all legal
claims made against the Natives.23
With his work completed, Clark headed back to
St. Louis, leaving the yet-to-be completed fort under
command of Captain Eli Clemson and the factory under
sole responsibility of George Sibley. However, this first
version signed at the fort was never ratified. Several Osage
chiefs, including the dominant war chief, Big Soldier, were
absent in September. Clark arranged for a meeting with
the remaining Osage leaders and presented them with a
similar treaty signed at the fort. Because they had never
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Besides founding St. Louis with his stepfather, Pierre Laclede,
Auguste Chouteau (1749-1829) was among the prominent
citizens of St. Louis in the early nineteenth century. He was
a dominant figure in the lucrative St. Louis fur trade, so he
knew a great deal about the tribes on the lower Missouri
River. He was a key source of such information for William
Clark and Meriwether Lewis before leaving on their trek in
1804 as well. (Image: Henry Hyde and Howard Conard,
Encyclopedea of the History of St. Louis, 1899; Mary
Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)

been defeated in battle, many of the remaining Osage were
reluctant. It took a year and the threat of a trade embargo
to convince the remaining chiefs to sign. The main
difference between the two versions was the addition of a
few more miles to the Osage territory around the fort, and
the removal of a special, and illegal, land grant for himself
that Pierre Chouteau had included when transcribing
the original treaty. Congress ratified the second treaty in
1810, and with it the American government purchased, at
about ten cents an acre, fifty thousand square miles of land
that included three-quarters of Missouri and the northern
half of Arkansas. The only land the Osage still retained
exclusively for themselves in Missouri was a band fifty

miles wide running vertically along the western border
from the Missouri River to the Arkansas border.24
President Jefferson, finishing his last remaining
months in office, believed his plan for voluntary Indian
removal was unfolding successfully, and his successor,
James Madison, was content to continue his predecessor’s
policy. The white population west of the Mississippi River
grew fast. In 1810 there were 20,845 American citizens,
concentrated mainly around New Orleans and St. Louis. In
Missouri, Clark’s expectations of a cessation of intertribal
fighting did not take place. While the Osage had agreed
to give up settling the eastern portion of the region, they
still claimed hunting rights in the Ozarks, and bands of
hunters often could not resist raiding the settlements of
relocated eastern tribes. Some of the immigrant tribes
conducted raids of their own. In 1810, for example, a band
of Potawatomis killed four Americans near Boone’s Lick,
Missouri. At Fort Osage, close to five thousand Indians
gathered to live and trade, and as tribes historically hostile
to the Big and Little arrived, tensions flared. A tribe of one
thousand Kansa Indians proved so violent and insolent
that Sibley barred them from the factory. Others who
had “smoked the Pipe of Peace” with the Osage and thus
were allowed to trade included Otoes, Mahas, Pawnees,
Missourias, Sioux, Ioways, and even Sacs and Foxes. Not
all of the Osage were happy living among so many former
enemies, however, and in 1811 many of them moved south
to live along the Marias des Cygnes River. During this
same year, Clark allowed the Osage to attack Ioway tribes
who harassed white settlers north of the Missouri River.
Even the peaceful Shawnee living along the Mississippi
River were beginning to be viewed with suspicion,
especially when it became known that Tecumseh, a
war chief allied with the British in the Ohio Valley, had
visited the settlements attempting to recruit warriors.
The Missouri Shawnee rejected the overtures, however,
preferring to live in peace with their white neighbors.25
Despite occasional horse and property theft, Indian
attacks on whites in Missouri before the War of 1812 were
rare. In 1806, two Kickapoo were hanged in St. Louis
for killing an American near the Osage River. While a
third Indian was implicated, President Jefferson’s policies
forbade the execution of more than two Natives for the
killing of one white. In 1809, President Monroe pardoned
two Sac Indians on the recommendation of William Clark
in return for a promise by the tribe for better behavior
in the future. Whites who killed Indians did not face
indictment, although Clark often paid the injured tribe an
indemnity against any future retaliation. Unless it affected
trade or white settlements, the government ignored Indianon-Indian violence in the territory except when the Natives
themselves sought legal aid. This supplication for white
justice happened nine times before Missouri statehood,
and, in two cases in 1806, resulted in execution. This lack
of concern by the majority of whites only encouraged
intertribal violence. As the white population continued to
grow and expand, however, they invariably became the
target for more and more raids.26
By 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal of peaceful, voluntary

removal from the east to the west, where the Indians
would become farmers, still seemed a viable goal. Already,
several tribes had relocated to Missouri, which now
was home not only to the Osage, but also the Kaskaskia
(an Illini tribe), Ioway, Delaware, Shawnee, Sac, Fox,
Miami, Kickapoo, Wea, and even some Cherokee along
the southern border. Trade at Fort Osage was brisk and
relatively free of problems. Although there were white
settlers in the territory, there were not enough to cause
many clashes with the relocated and resident Natives.
There were, however, storm clouds gathering on the
horizon. British traders, indifferent to Jefferson’s plans,
countered much of the factory’s influence. Jay’s Treaty
of 1794 allowed British traders to ply their goods on
American soil as long as they obeyed federal law. The
British often hinted, or even told the Natives, that the
United States wanted to take all of their lands. In addition,
they often supplied superior goods, were willing to extend
credit, and would trade whiskey. The latter two were not
allowed in the American system.27
Although government factories were essential to
indebt the Indians, private traders, once they obtained a
license, could also trade with the Natives. The competition
created a problem because the factories were necessary
to the Jefferson ideal to “civilize” the Natives, while
private traders were only interested in profit. In Missouri,
the dominant traders were Auguste and Pierre Chouteau,
Manuel Lisa, Joseph Robidoux (founder of St. Joseph),
and John Jacob Astor, who was quickly growing in
influence and wealth. These private traders, especially
Astor, were a greater threat to the Jeffersonian factory
system than the British. When Congress finally ended
the factory system in 1822, it also destroyed any hope of
achieving the Jeffersonian ideal.28
By 1811, the British military also posed a threat
to Jefferson’s plans. The failure by the United States
economically or militarily to enforce peace gave many
tribes the false idea that the English would support
traditional Native existence. As Great Britain attempted
to draw different tribes across the Ohio Valley and Old
Northwest into an alliance against the United States,
Superintendent Clark and others were acutely aware of the
danger of something similar happening in Missouri. Clark
sent George Sibley to the Platte River area to convince
the Natives, especially the Pawnee, to continue their
friendly relations with the United States. Although the
Western Shawnee had rejected Tecumseh’s overtures, the
superintendent seriously considered “dispersing” the tribe
across the territory just in case. The Osage seemed content
with their American alliance, but the tribe was notorious
for ignoring promises of peaceful cohabitation. The
proximity of the Sac and Fox tribes posed an immediate
threat to St. Louis. Not only were their settlements near,
but many of the Natives had never forgiven the United
States for the Treaty of 1804. If war came with Britain,
Clark was certain many Sacs and Foxes would ally with
America’s enemy.29
From 1803 to 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal seemed
the perfect solution to American-Native relations. The
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War of 1812 and its aftermath across the Mississippi
River basin, however, ended for many the optimistic
hope for peaceful coexistence. Even nature itself seemed
intent on proclaiming the coming change. On December

16, 1811, and again on February 7, 1812, earthquakes
devastated lands along the New Madrid fault line. The
powerful shocks were felt as far away as Quebec and New
York and caused the Mississippi River to briefly flow

A number of artists traveled from St. Louis westward and portrayed native tribes, but Europeans were fascinated by them as
well. They were portrayed here in a French newspaper in 1827. (Image: State Historical Society of Missouri)
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Manuel Lisa’s home in St. Louis was also home for his furtrading business, competing with the Chouteaus. Lisa had
families in both St. Louis and among the Osage. (Image:
Library of Congress)

backwards. The quakes seemed to mark a watershed for
Indian-white relations in Missouri, heralding the end of
semi-equanimity and marking the beginning of dominance
by those of European descent.30 In the years following
that catastrophic event, the Jefferson ideal of voluntary
assimilation rapidly fell apart. The end of the War of
1812 forever ended any British interest in allying with the
Indians of the plains; thus, the United States no longer
had to compete for cooperation, leaving the Natives little
recourse but to accept whatever deal was proposed to them
by the whites. The rapid influx of white settlers in the
decades after the war quickly overwhelmed the relatively
small number of Natives in the Missouri territory. Indian
raids were now met with swift and terrible retribution. The
disintegration of the relatively benevolent government
trade monopoly into the hands of private individuals with
almost no interest in the welfare of the Natives quickly
destroyed any remaining dignity or culture they might
have had left. While Jefferson may or may not have
believed in his own plan or whether it was simply the most
expedient way to clear tribes from east of the Mississippi
is unclear. What is certain is that his immediate successors
formulated no better or even a different plan. The result
was that within a few short decades, all remaining Indians
in Missouri were expelled, forced to move even further
westward by a society that defined the words “benevolent
plans meritoriously applied” differently from the previous
generation.

St. Louis was a remarkably diverse place in some ways in
the early nineteenth century. Although founded by French
nationals in 1764, it was held by the Spanish until the start
of the nineteenth century, then became part of the United
States in 1804. Manuel Lisa (1772-1820) ranked as one
of St. Louis’ prominent Spanish fur traders. (Image: Missouri
History Museum)
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